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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
STATE FARM EXHAUSTED ITS ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES. 
Appellees argue that State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company ("State Farm") failed to exhaust all administrative 
remedies available to it and is thereby precluded from seeking 
trials de novo in the district court. However, State Farm did 
exhaust all mandatory administrative remedies prior to filing its 
petitions for review of the final agency actions in the Third 
Judicial District Court. The fatal flaw in the appellees' 
argument is their failure to interpret and harmonize the 
provisions of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, § 34-35-1 et 
seq., the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-l et seq., and the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division 
Administrative Rules, R. 560-1 et seq. The appellees merely 
focus on a single section or subpart of a particular statute and 
fail to interpret and harmonize that section or subpart with the 
entire statutory scheme embodied in the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Act, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, and the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Division Administrative Rules. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 sets forth the procedure applica-
ble to a discrimination claim brought under state law. This 
statute sets forth two distinct procedures. The procedures set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7 .1 (1)-(5) are specifically 
defined as informal adjudicative proceedings. Utah Anti-
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Discrimination Division Administrative Rule, R. 560-l-3(f). 
After the informal proceedings are concluded, this statute pro-
vides that a party may request an evidentiary hearing to review 
de novo the director's determination and order. It is the posi-
tion of the appellees that failure to request this evidentiary 
hearing equates to a failure to exhaust available administrative 
remedies. This interpretation is not supported by the express 
language of the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 (5) (c) 
specifically provides as follows: 
A party may file a written request to the 
director for an evidentiary hearing to review 
de novo the director's determination and order-
within 30 days of the date of the determina-
tion and order. [Emphasis added] 
The permissive language contained in this subpart indicates that 
a party is not required to request an evidentiary hearing, and 
can allow the order to become a final order and then seek a trial 
de novo in the district court. 
The Anti-Discrimination Act sets forth a statutory scheme 
which permits an adversely affected party to take two courses of 
action in respect to seeking further review of the determination 
and order resulting from the informal adjudicative proceedings. 
An adversely affected party can request an evidentiary hearing 
and convert the informal process into a formal adjudicative 
hearing or the adversely affected party can allow the determina-
tion and order to become a final order and seek a trial de novo 
in the district court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63~46b-15. 
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Reduced to its basics, State Farm's position is that there is 
a "fork" in the road which permits the adversely affected party 
to pursue either of the two courses of action set forth above. 
It is the position of the appellees that no such fork exists and 
that an adversely affected party is limited to requesting an 
evidentiary hearing and converting the informal process into a 
formal adjudicative hearing. Appellees' argument fails to 
harmonize the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act, the Utah Anti-discrimination Act, and the Utah Anti-
discrimination Division Rules. 
It cannot be disputed that the provisions set forth at Utah 
Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(1)-(5) sets forth an informal adjudicative 
process. Utah Anti-Discrimination Division Administrative Rule, 
R 560-l-3(f). The Utah Administrative Procedures Act specifical-
ly states that final agency action resulting from informal 
adjudicative proceedings can be appealed to the district court 
for a trial de novo. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-15 (1) (a) provides 
in pertinent part as follows: 
The district courts have jurisdiction to 
review by trial de novo all final agency 
actions resulting from informal adjudicative 
proceedings . . . 
Thus, because this is a final agency action resulting from an 
informal adjudication proceeding, State Farm is entitled to seek 
a trial de novo in the district court. If one accepts appellees' 
position, one must ignore the clear language of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-15. 
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Appellees rely heavily on High Country Homeowners Ass'n v. 
Public Service Comm'n of Utah, 779 P.2d 682 (Utah 1989). In that 
case, the High Country Homeowners Association sought review by 
the Utah Supreme Court of an order issued by the Public Service 
Commission. The Division of Public Utilities intervened, and 
moved for summary disposition on jurisdictional grounds claiming 
that the Homeowners Association had failed to comply with the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 57-7-15. That statute provides in 
pertinent part: 
Review or Rehearing by Commission — 
Application — Procedure — Prerequisite to 
Court Action. 
(1) Before seeking judicial review of the 
Commissioner's action, any party, 
stockholder, bond holder, or other person 
pecuniarily interested in the public 
utility who is dissatisfied with an order 
of the commission shall meet the 
requirements of this section. 
(2) (a) After any order or decision has been 
made by the commission, any party to 
the action or proceeding, or any 
stockholder or bond holder or other-
party pecuniarily interested in the 
public utility affected may apply 
for re-hearing of any matters deter-
mined in the action or proceeding. 
(b) No applicant may urge or rely on any 
ground not set forth in the applica-
tion in an appeal to any court., 
[Emphasis added] 
Clearly, the statute at issue in the High Country case is 
distinguishable from Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-7-15 specifically requires by the use of the word "shall" 
that parties dissatisfied with an order of the commission shall 
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meet the requirements of this section. This statute indicates 
that an adversely affected party may apply for re-hearing of any 
matters determined in the action or proceeding. It is apparently 
appellees' position that the subsequent use of the word "may" is 
comparable to the language contained in Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-
7.1. However, this interpretation is flawed in that Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-7-15(1) expressly states that a party "shall" meet the 
requirements of this section before obtaining judicial review. 
This type of mandatory language is not present in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34-35-7.1. 
The only Utah case which interprets a statute containing a 
similar use of the permissive "may" language as opposed to the 
mandatory "shall" language in respect to seeking further agency 
review is Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah 
App. 1991). In Heinecke, the Court of Appeals held that the 
plaintiff did not need to seek review of the division's 
determination prior to obtaining judicial review. In reaching 
that result, the Court of Appeals held as follows: 
[N]o provision in the statutes governing the 
division appears to provide for a review 
beyond the divisional level as contemplated in 
§ 12(1)(a) of UAPA, which review would in any 
case be optional so as not to defeat finality 
for the purposes of judicial review given the 
"permanent" and "may" usages of the section, 
nor is any mandatory review provided for as 
contemplated in Section 12(3). 
Heinecke, 810 P.2d at 463. Appellees are apparently taking the 
position that Heinecke was wrongly decided because the issue 
concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies was not properly 
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briefed.1 However, the Heinecke decision indicates that counsel 
for the division specifically brought to the Utah Court of 
Appeals' attention the case of High Country Homeowners v. Public 
Service Comm'n, 779 P.2d 682 (Utah 1989). This is the primary 
case relied upon by appellees. The Utah Court of Appeals noted 
that the High Country court found that Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15 
imposed a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review of the 
PSC's action, and held that "failing to apply for re-hearing 
within 20 days of the commission's issuance of the order divests 
[the Supreme Court] of subject matter jurisdiction." Heinecke, 
810 P.2d at 462-63; citing High Country Homeowners, 779 P.2d at 
684. The Heinecke court noted that the case presently before 
them was, as is the instant case, subject to no such 
jurisdictional prerequisite. 
In the instant case, Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7 .1 (5) (c)-(d) 
states: 
(c) A party may file a written request to the 
director for an evidentiary hearing to 
review de novo the director's determina-
tion and order within 30 days of the date 
of the determination and order. 
(d) If the director receives no timely 
request for a hearing, the determination 
and order issued by the director 
requiring the respondent to cease any 
discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice and to provide relief to the 
Although the specific issue was not briefed by the parties, 
the Utah Court of Appeals indicated that it conducted its own 
independent research concerning this issue. Heinecke, 810 P.2d at 
463. 
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aggrieved party becomes the final order 
of the commission. [Emphasis added] 
This code section contains the permissive language referred 
to in the Heinecke case. As the Heinecke court pointed out, 
where such permissive language is used, the decision by a party 
not to pursue the "optional" further administrative review does 
not bar that party from seeking judicial review based on a 
purported failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act sets forth a unique proce-
dural method for resolving state law anti-discrimination claims. 
The act specifically sets forth an informal adjudicative process 
that can result in final agency action if a formal evidentiary is 
not requested. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(1)-(5). These proce-
dures have been specifically defined as an informal adjudicative 
proceeding. Rule 560-l-3(f). Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 
specifically provides that district courts have jurisdiction to 
review by trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from 
informal adjudicative proceedings. Clearly, if the legislature 
had intended that the proceedings set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34-35-7 . 1 (1)-(5) were some type of process that did not qualify 
as an informal adjudicative proceeding, then it would have been 
defined as such. However, the express designation of this 
section of the statute as an informal adjudicative proceeding 
renders the review mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 
applicable. 
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Appellees also claim that State Farm confuses "final agency 
action" with agency action that subsequently becomes a "final 
order." However, the appellees admit that the determination and 
order became a "final agency action" when the time for requesting 
the further optional administrative review had lapsed. Brief of 
Appellee, Brenda Mena, p. 16. Clearly, because the further 
optional appellate review was not requested, the action taken by 
the agency constituted final agency action. Appellant's argument 
to the contrary is purely a matter of semantics. It is incongru-
ous to argue that because an additional optional administrative 
remedy could have been pursued, that there can never be a "final 
agency action" that would allow State Farm to seek judicial 
review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15. 
A. State Farm's Interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 
Would Not Cause Possible Inconsistent Results. 
Appellees take the position that under State Farm's interpre-
tation of the applicable statutes, contrary and inconsistent 
results could be attained. It is appellees' position that if 
both parties were "aggrieved" by the determination and order 
issued as a result of the informal adjudicative proceedings, that 
one party could seek an administrative evidentiary hearing on 
damages and the other party could request a trial de novo in the 
district court, seeking to have the informal adjudicative order 
overturned. However, this scenario could not occur based upon 
the applicable statutory language. 
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If one party requests an evidentiary hearing to review 
de novo the director's determination and order pursuant to Utah 
Code § 34-35-7.1(5)(c), then final agency action would not have 
occurred which would prohibit a request for a trial de novo in 
the district court. Final agency action does not exist until 30 
days after the determination and order is issued. If any party 
requests an evidentiary hearing within 30 days after the informal 
adjudicative procedure has resulted in a determination and order, 
then the matter would be converted to a formal adjudication. 
POINT II. 
STATE FARM'S APPEALS WERE TIMELY FILED WITH 
THE DISTRICT COURTS. 
Appellees argue that State Farm's petitions were not timely 
filed and that State Farm should have filed the petitions within 
30 days of the date of issuance. However, appellees' argument 
fails to take into consideration the specific and unique 
statutory language contained in Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1. As 
stated in State Farm's initial brief, Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-
7.1(5)(c)-(d) clearly states that an informal adjudicative order 
becomes final 30 days after it is issued if no timely request for 
an evidentiary hearing is made. Therefore, because the order was 
not final until 30 days after issuance, State Farm could not 
appeal to the district courts until that time period had expired. 
Appellees rely on Dusty's, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992). However, this 
reliance is misplaced. In Dusty's, the Utah Supreme Court held 
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that the relevant time period is 30 days from the issuance of the 
order constituting final agency action. However, the "findings 
of facts, conclusions of law, and final decision" of the Tax 
Commission in that case provided a specific notice which stated: 
NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the 
date of this order to file in the Supreme 
Court a petition for judicial review. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-13(1), 53-46b-14(2)(a). 
It is clear that in Dusty's
 f the "final decision" was a final 
order on the date of its issuance. However, due to the unique 
statutory language of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, the 
informal adjudicative procedure did not result in a final order 
until 30 days after the issuance of the order. It would have 
been impossible for State Farm to file its petition with the 
district court within 30 days of the issuance of the order. 
CONCLUSION 
The district courts erred in their interpretation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 by failing to construe the statute so as to 
give effect to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-l et seq. The statutory scheme embodied in the 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act and the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act sets forth two options for a party who is 
adversely affected by an informal adjudicative decision. The 
first option is to seek an agency evidentiary hearing and convert 
the informal adjudication to a formal adjudication. The second 
option is to allow the informal adjudication to became a final 
order and then request a trial de novo in the district court. 
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The district courts erred in concluding that the second option 
did not exist. The district courts' conclusion ignores the 
Administrative Procedures Act and focuses solely on the 
provisions of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, failing to 
harmonize the provisions of those statutory schemes. The 
judgments of dismissal should be reversed. 
DATED this ^ day of r r t ^ ^ ^ X ^ - , 1995. 
STRONG/&yftANNI 
.enn C. Hanrti 
Robert L. Janicki 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
206768nh 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of State Farm were mailed, first class postage 
prepaid, this /ptz day of /*?/?& t^JL> , ^  1^95, to the 
following: 
EVAN A. SCHMUTZ 
DAVID G. TURCOTTE 
3319 N. University Avenue 
Jamestown Square, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellees 
DANIEL S. SAM 
889 N. Freedom Blvd., Suite 102 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellees 
ALLAN HENNEBOLD 
SHARON J. EBLEN 
P. 0. Box 14660 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Industrial Commission 
Felix Jensen 
2060 Brewer 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
12 
